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Choice in a two systems world: picking & weighing
or managing & metacognition
Tillmann Vierkant1
# The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Intuitively, choices seem to be intentional actions but it is difficult to see how
they could be. If our choices are all about weighing up reasons then there seems no
room for an additional intentional act of choice. Richard Holton has suggested a
solution to this puzzle, which involves thinking of choices in a two systems of
cognition framework. Holton’s suggestion does solve the puzzle, but has some unsat-
isfactory consequences. This paper wants to take over the important insights from
Holton on the phenomenology of choice and the possible explanation via a two systems
framework, but wants to suggest an alternative more satisfactory account. This account
is built around the idea that choices are what Pamela Hieronymi calls managerial acts.
After developing the claim the paper then defends it against the objection that mana-
gerial control cannot be understood in a system1 context, by examining recent research
on uncertainty monitoring and early forms of metacognition.
Keywords Choice . Picking .Metacognition . Two systems .Mental actions
Standard belief desire accounts of action have a problem. They seem to leave no room
for choices made by agents. All that has to be done for a decision is to execute a
weighing process of the relevant beliefs and desires. The process that leads to the
choice does not look agentive at all, but as Velleman (1992) aptly puts it ‘hydraulical’.
It is as if one could hear the whirring of cogs and imagine the pumps operating to
produce the intention. Such a process, whatever else it may be, seems to have very little
to do with choices in the ordinary sense. Choices in every day language are actions
made by agents and they feel genuinely open. It doesn’t feel as if choices only require
the execution of a calculation process that leads to a determined outcome.
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Richard Holton in his 2009 book Willing Wanting Waiting has provided a possible
solution to how to bring the agent back into the process of choice. One strength of
Holton’s account is that it is empirically informed. Holton does not only use armchair
intuitions, but integrates his observations about our experience with a cutting edge
psychological perspective. His argument is built on a two systems approach to human
cognition (Stanovich 2011; Frankish and Evans 2009; Carruthers 2009, 2011; Evans
and Stanovich 2013) 1 and uses a number of experiments at various points of the
argument to support his claims.
This paper will trace the steps of Holton’s argument to work out its strong points, but
then focus on a serious flaw. Holton attempts to do justice to the intuition that we can
intentionally choose what to do by claiming that choice involves an element of picking.
The paper argues that this is mistaken. It is true that the phenomenology of choice
involves an intentional action, but picking is neither necessary nor even particularly
useful to explain choice. Instead the paper suggests that we should think of choices as
managerial acts. The paper will explain how such an account would work. But in doing
so it will become clear that a satisfactory account of choice that relies on a two system
background and thereby ventures into the field of the cognitive sciences can profit
enormously from looking at choice related discussions in this field. The paper will
focus here on the literature on uncertainty monitoring and metacognition, which, as we
will see, is very closely connected to the phenomenon Holton is interested in. Doing
this will allow us to address a pressing worry to the proposed account and at the same
time put it on a plausible empirically supported footing.
1 Part 1 Picking v managerial control
Holton’s argument begins with three intuitive desiderata for a phenomenologically
satisfying account of choice. First, choice is not fully determined by our beliefs and
desires. Secondly, choices are sufficient for actions. In contrast to other psychological
states like beliefs and desires, choices are directly linked to actions. Finally, and most
importantly in this context choices are intentional actions. He writes
BChoice is an act. It requires time, concentration and a certain amount of effort.^
Page 54.
Holton wants to achieve two things for choice. He wants it to be an intentional
action, but crucially, at the same time Holton wants to show that choice is nevertheless
not reducible to arbitrary picking. Choices should be more than simply randomly
picking out, say, one of many identical tins of tomatoes on the supermarket shelf.2
As we will see, though initially promising, Holton’s argument is ultimately unsat-
isfactory. However, in investigating why it does not work we will learn an important
1 According to this framework human cognition employs two different forms of processing. System one is
evolutionary old, unconscious, fast and automatic, while system 2 is evolutionarily young, conscious, slow,
and controlled.
2 For the distinction between picking and choosing see Ullmann-Margalit and Morgenbesser (1977). Picking
and Choosing. Social Research, 44(4), 757–785.
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lesson about indirect intentional control of the mind and the role of different forms of
metacognition for this process.
1.1 Holton’s argument
So how does Holton’s argument work? As already mentioned above, it doesn’t seem as
if there is space for an action like choice in a standard belief desire framework of action.
All that agents ever do is weigh options, but this weighing even though it sounds active
has nothing to do with a real action. Instead it is the mechanical operation of adding up
the values of reasons that the agent has for performing either action a or action b. There
does not seem to be space for an agent in this process. Holton’s answer to this
conundrum involves two elements: uncertainty and hunches.
The first step of the argument points out that there are very many situations in an
agent’s life where it is not obvious what the right course of action is.3 Now obviously, not
every action is like that. Often in life, when faced with two or more options, agents don’t
need to make a choice that is a distinct action. They simply know which action they
prefer and the question of whether to do the other thing instead does not get deliberated
over. The action is selected automatically and there is nothing like an act of choice.
But it is equally common that the agent will be faced with two options where it is not
immediately obvious which one is the better one. Sometimes a bit of deliberation will
resolve the issue, and as soon as an agent reaches a judgment that the one option is
clearly the better one, again this option will get selected without anything that is
recognisable as a separate act of choice.
But sometimes even a bit of deliberation will not resolve the issue completely. As we
are finite human beings and not doing anything is oftenworse than doing either A or B, we
often have to pick one of two options, even though we do not really know which of the
options is the better one. Now in contrast to the mechanical weighing of reasons, simply
picking one of two options is a very typical instance of an intentional mental action. It is
intuitively possible for the agent to pick A or B just as easily as it is to lift one’s arm or not.
However, there is also a problem with acts of choice like this. The way the story is
told so far, these acts of choice seem very much reduced to random picking. There is no
particular decisive reason why the agent chooses the one option over the other. So
while these choices look like real intentional actions it is unclear whether they really
deserve the name choice.
This is where Holton’s second step comes in. He argues that choices feel like they
are random to the conscious subject, but that they are in fact not random at all. The
subject has the impression that she simply picked one of two equal options, because she
does not have access to all the information that she has picked up. Unconsciously, the
agent might well ‘know’ which option to prefer, but the conscious subject does not
know why she is attracted to the option she chooses.
With these two elements Holton gets a choice that is very clearly an intentional
action where the decision is fully arbitrary at the conscious level, but at the same time it
3 Importantly Holton does not want to restrict choice to the much discussed phenomena involving true
incompatibility. Michael Bratman, BA Desire of One’s Own,^ The Journal of Philosophy 100.5 (2003),
Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) Instead he focuses on the much more common
phenomenon that we simply don’t know in the time available for the decision what the better course of action
would be.
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is not just random picking, because the agent makes her choice on a hunch, i.e. on
information that she has unconsciously but that she can’t use for conscious deliberation.
This is a neat idea, but there is an obvious problem that Holton also sees. While on
his account it is true that the conscious choice is not determined by a conscious
judgment, the picture gets more complicated once we look at the whole mind. This is
because it looks as if the agent is making her choice very much because of an
unconscious judgment.
Holton has two replies to this: First of all, he wonders whether we really can call the
unconscious processing a judgment at all. Is it not too encapsulated for that?
But Holton does admit that perhaps this strategy has a problem, because it is less and
less clear whether it really is true that unconscious processing does not have the right
complexity. His second argument therefore makes do without the assumption that there
are no unconscious judgments.4
The second argument simply says that he is interested in showing that agents
experience choice in the absence of conscious judgements and that the choices that
are such experienced are nevertheless not random. The account seems to make good on
that claim, even if choices turn out to follow unconscious judgments. The initial
demand for a plausible account of choice was that choices should not be reducible to
our beliefs and desires and this is exactly what the hunch story allows without having to
rely on mere picking.
1.2 Holton’s choice complications
Holton’s account of choice seems like a neat way to have your rational cake and
still intentionally eat it. But once we look closer there is a serious problem with
this account and it is not even that difficult to uncover. Let’s look at Holton’s
second and final argument that he doesn’t mind if choices are caused by uncon-
scious judgments, because his account is about conscious choice, a bit more
closely. What seems so excellent about the account is that it does include a real
intentional action on the conscious level. At the same time, the choice is not
random, because it is influenced by the unconscious judgment. But while it is
clearly true that Holton has achieved his formal desiderata for choice (i.e. not
reducible to conscious beliefs and desires and has to be an action) there is still an
odd lacuna in Holton’s account. Holton does not tell us how it is that the
unconscious judgment influences the conscious picking. Perhaps he thinks that
there simply is no experiential echo at all. In this case, the influence on behaviour
would be rather like blind sight (Weiskrantz 1986). 5 This would fit well with
Holton’s emphasis on picking: All the agent feels is that the choice is completely
random and could just as well be decided by the tossing of a coin. Holton can
even allow that we can nevertheless learn a lot about our attitudes from choosing,
even though the causes of our choices are hidden to us, by simply observing our
choices. We observe what we do and infer something about our mind from these
observations – perhaps even something about the world that the unconscious part
4 While it is obvious still up for debate whether there can be unconscious judgments in the context of this
paper we will assume that they can exist and therefore concentrate on Holton’s second strategy.
5 Thanks to Robert Deutschlaender for this apt comparison.
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of the mind had picked up on.6 If we find ourselves picking one option rather than
the other, then we can often infer from that that we did have a reason for that
choice, even though we might not be consciously aware of it.
Thus, even if there is no experiential echo of the unconscious judgment at all, this
does not mean that the information cannot reach consciousness after the choice has
been made.
However, if it were the case that observation would be the only way to get access to
the information that biases our choices, then this would also mean that the conscious
agent would have no access at all at the time of the choice. If this is indeed the case,
then we would have to think ourselves lucky that we do not often really use random-
ness generators to make these choices, because presumably that would render the useful
and completely unconscious biasing null and void, and we would not be able to use all
the information it provides.
So are choices really like blindsight with absolutely no experiental echo of the
unconscious judgement, as Holton seems to suggest? I want to argue that this is
unlikely and in fact, even the cases Holton uses as examples for his argument seem
to suggest that, contrary to his account, there is some form of access to the unconscious
judgment.
One of Holton’s key examples e.g. involves a fireman who can consciously
see no reason why he should leave a house where they are fighting a seemingly
harmless one-storey fire, but who has the strong sense that he needs to get out
and retreats. Here it turns out that the feeling saves his life, because minutes
later the house collapses. In this case, there obviously is a very intense
conscious experience that makes the fireman leave the house. The thing that
is different to an ordinary conscious judgment is that the fireman does not
understand the reasons for why he has the feeling. However, the fireman does
have an experiential echo of the unconscious judgment and it is this hunch that
he trusts, even though he does not know the reasons for having it.7
So why does Holton insist in his theoretical account that the conscious
choice is an intentional arbitrary picking action, if even his own example
suggests that the action is not arbitrary at all, even on the experiential level,
but consists in following a hunch? One reason might be that once we accept
that the conscious hunch is a sufficient reason for the choice, it does not seem
as if the choice is an intentional, arbitrary picking. So it seems Holton either
has to lose his intentional picking component, or he can’t allow for such
hunches to be conscious.
6 Obviously sometimes this can go wrong and in these cases, we end up confabulating a rationalisation of our
behaviour. This is according to Holton what happens in the seminal Nisbett experiments (Nisbett and Wilson
1977) where subjects defend their picking the garment on the right of a row of identical items, which is
actually caused by an unconscious bias to the right, by inventing quality differences between identical
garments to rationalise their choice.
7 I discuss this also in Vierkant (2012). There I make a distinction between explicit and aware, i.e. the fireman
is aware of his Feeling of Knowing (FOK), but cannot put into words why he feels it. But actually, this is even
more complicated. In Holton’s scenario the fireman does know in language that he has a FOK and trusts it
perhaps because he has reasons to trust it, even though he does not know why he has the FOK, but it could
also be a scenario where the fireman is aware of and acts on his FOK without recognizing it as such.
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1.3 Choice as managerial control
In what follows, I want to look at a way of saving Holton’s idea of choice as an
intentional action while at the same time allowing for the intuitively plausible scenario
where the choosing agent is aware of the hunch that leads to the choice.
However, my account differs from Holton’s in that it does not put the same emphasis
on random picking.
To achieve this, we first need to introduce a piece of terminology: the notion of
managerial control (Hieronymi 2009). The solution I want to propose lies in thinking of
Holton’s choices as managerial acts. However, before we can begin to develop this
account, a few clarifications are in order. First of all, we need to put some more meat on
the bones of the notion of managerial control: Managerial control is an intentional mental
action with the purpose of creating an environment that will facilitate cognitive activity
and the management of attitudes. Importantly for Hieronymi, even though managerial
mental actions are the only mental actions that function very much like ordinary bodily
actions, they are not the most important form of mental agency. Indeed, on Hieronymi’s
account, the fundamental and normal way of mental agency is cognitive agency. 8
However, while cognitive agency is the most important form of mental agency, on her
picture, it is quite different from ordinary bodily agency. One crucial difference for our
context is that cognitive acts are never intentional acts – instead, prototypical cognitive
acts are judgments, but also e.g. the acquisition of an intention. In the tradition of doxastic
non voluntarism (e.g. Chrisman 2008; Strawson 2003; Williams 1973), Hieronymi holds
that such acts cannot be voluntary acts, because one of the essential characteristics of
voluntary acts is that it is up to the agent to decide whether or not to perform them, but it is
not up to the agent to randomly decide what to judge or what to intend.
However, while Hieronymi argues that it is not possible to decide what to judge or
what to intend directly, there is a way in which an agent can bring it about that they
judge or form an intention indirectly. This intentional bringing about of the right
cognitive environment to influence the non-voluntary judgment is what managerial
control achieves. An agent can e.g. intentionally concentrate on a problem, rehearse an
argument, go to a library, etc. All these actions are perfectly normal intentional actions
and they all have the aim of influencing the environment in such a way that a cognitive
act will bring the desired result.
Importantly, these managerial acts are not simply a second independent way of
acquiring beliefs or intentions, but rather a specific complex form of mental action that
is possible for agents who can perform a certain form of cognitive act. This is because
all managerial acts on Hieronymi’s picture contain two cognitive acts: The agent first
has to form the intention to perform the managerial act and secondly, after the
managerial action, the agent still has to perform a non-voluntary cognitive act to
acquire the desired attitude.
What I want to argue here is that the phenomenon of choice that Holton describes
(intentional action, but still not random) can be best understood as a managerial action.
However, there seems to be a major problem in combining Holton and Hieronymi.
Hieronymi thinks that forming an intention is a cognitive act. But isn’t the formation of
an intention and a choice the same thing? If we were to assume that forming an
8 Hieronymi speaks of evaluative acts. I use cognitive and evaluative as synonyms in this context.
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intention is the same as making a choice, then it seems that choices on Hieronymi’s
picture cannot be managerial actions at all, because managerial actions are always
intentional and cognitive acts are never intentional.9
Fortunately, the problem disappears once we look more closely at what forming an
intention is for Hieronymi. According to her, intention formation is a practical judg-
ment of what the best thing to do is, all things considered. So intention formations are
cognitive acts because they are a form of judgment. In contrast, as already discussed,
for Holton, choices are acts that agents perform especially when they are insecure about
what the right cause of action is. In other words, choices are what agents use when they
are uncertain about what to do and have no obvious means to dissolve this uncertainty
and can therefore not form an all things considered judgment about the best cause of
action. In other words, what Holton does is describe a phenomenon that Hieronymi
does not explicitly discuss in her work. Hence, this paper wants to argue that there is
nevertheless a very promising way to use her frame work to make good on the
important and plausible conditions that Holton sets up to explain the phenomenology
of choice.
Here is how this might work: Let’s first think about this phenomenology of choice
again. As Holton rightly points out, choices often demand considerable effort. It is hard
to decide which option to pick, if one doesn’t know which one is the better one. But in a
way that is surprising, if his account is the right one. If it really feels to the agent that
there is no difference between the options she can pick from, then that should not be
difficult. Indeed, it should be as simple as throwing dice. What is hard are the attempts
to figure out what is better and to inhibit a constant reopening of the question, once one
feels that further deliberation would be counterproductive. These intentional acts of
attending to the question and of inhibiting the reopening of deliberation obviously only
happen if the agent feels that it is appropriate to attend to the problem and to inhibit
further deliberation. In other words, they are dependent on a prior cognitive act. They
are intentional acts to manage the cognitive process and are caused by a prior
evaluation that such management is appropriate.10
Holton might not like this, because he insists that choices can happen before
judgements and that is certainly not true on this picture, because choices are the direct
consequence of unconscious judgments, but as discussed before, Holton is willing to
concede that choices might be the product of unconscious judgments as long as they do
not depend on conscious ones. In fact as we have seen he himself is quite open about
choices being the consequence of an unconscious judgment.
With this solution we do get an explanation for why choices can be thought of as
intentional actions. However, what we do not get from this solution is an important role
for picking in choice. It is clear that choices in this sense don’t need to be acts of
picking to be intentional. Holton thought that choices could only be intentional actions
if they are pickings, because the real business of choice, which is to evaluate which is
the better option, is done by an evaluative process that cannot be intentional. But once
we introduce managerial control there is another option. There are rational acts that
9 Thanks to the reviewer who pressed me on this point.
10 My account of choice here is in many ways similar to Shepherd’s (2014) account of decisions as intentional
actions. However, while I agree with Shepherd that deciding can be understood intentionally, I want to insist
that this only works if we understand it also managerially in the sense discussed. Decision itself then has no
rational dimension. For a detailed discussion see Vierkant (in preparation)
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require intentional mind directed acts in order to get a choice right. If we understand
choices as these managerial acts then it is easy to see why choices are intentional
actions and why they have been traditionally understood as ‘decisions to’. They are not
about evaluating what is best, but about cajoling the mind in to following through on its
evaluations, to produce the best possible conditions for the evaluation and to actively
inhibit responses if the evaluation is not safe enough yet.
As the evaluative acts that cause the managerial acts are unconscious the account
also explains why these choices can feel like pickings.
Holton is right then that choices often feel like picking for the agent, but while this is
true, it is a red herring to describe this experience as important for the reason why
choices are actions. Choices are actions, because they work exactly like ordinary
intentional bodily actions. The only difference is that while bodily actions have a world
directed intention, the intentions that guide choices are attitude directed.
We now have an account of choice that does explain the phenomenology of picking
and effort in choice, but one where the importance of picking is illusory. Instead what
makes the choice in this sense intentional is simply that it is an act of managerial
control.
Where does this leave us? Like Holton the account can explain that choices feel like
intentional actions (because they are) and also feel like pickings (because the agent is
not aware of the rational acts that cause the managerial ones). So like Holton’s account
the one suggested here does solve the issue of the agentive phenomenology of choice,
but in contrast to the Holton account it does not have to rely on picking for this. This
seems like a good result. However, there is one important catch here. Obviously, for the
account to work it has to be possible to understand properly how the intentional actions
that make up our choices really can be thought of as managerial control.
2 Part 2: A problem: Can choice really be attitude-directed?
I argued that we should think of choice as managerial control. But this might seem
surprising given the definitions suggested earlier. Managerial control is supposed to be
attitude-directed, but choices seem not to be about attitudes at all, but rather, about what
to do. (see also Vierkant 2013) where I first raise this issue). How is it possible that
there are intentional actions that control attitudes when the agent is not at all interested
in attitude control, but simply tries to achieve world directed goals. In other words how
could it be possible to have a form of control that is dependent on thinking about
thinking when all the thinking involved is aimed at achieving something else.
2.1 Metacognition and choice
To understand how the notion of managerial control could be sensibly employed in the
context of a revamped Holton choice it makes sense to take a step back and to think
more generally about the notion of metacognition which seems a very closely related
notion to attitude-directed thought in the cognitive science literature. Like attitude
directed thought metacognition is a form of thinking about thinking. But while attitude
directed thought in Hieronymi is a form of thought by human adults who understand
psychological concepts and can consciously think about them, in the cognitive sciences
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metacognition is also used by some authors to describe a form of thought that does
require a lot less stringent conditions to be fulfilled. If such early forms of metacogni-
tion could play a functional role that resembles the managerial account of choice
outlined above then that might disable the worry that the managerial model can’t be
right, because it requires conscious attitude directed thought to get of the ground.
An example of such phylogenetically early forms of metacognition can be found in a
series of much discussed experiments by David Smith and colleagues (2003), who
tested uncertainty monitoring in macaques. The animals had to decide whether a screen
presented to them was densely or sparsely pixelated. There was an arbitrary cut off
point of 1500 pixels. More than that and the picture had to be rated as dense. Obviously,
solving this task becomes harder and at some point impossible to solve, the closer you
get to the arbitrary cut off point.
Before we have a look at what the researchers found, it is worth thinking about what
the connections between this experiment and our discussion of choice are. They are
fairly obvious anyway. The monkeys are asked to make a ‘choice’ between two options
(dense or sparse). They are rewarded with food if they get it right and penalised with
waiting time until the next trial11 if they get it wrong. The macaques are very good at
solving this task if the pixellation is relatively far away from the cut off point, but the
closer it gets to the cut-off point, the more their choices become simply arbitrary
picking, because they do not have the resources to make such a fine grained distinction.
The two scenarios present both horns of the traditional dilemma of choice. If it is
possible to know whether the screen is sparse or dense, then the choice seems
mechanical and there seems no need for intentional action in the process of choice,
and if it is not, then the choice seems to be no more than arbitrary picking.
The interesting thing about these experiments is that the researchers introduced a
third option into the mix. The macaques could not only press dense or sparse, but they
were also offered a third option which would simply give them a new trial, without
waiting time, but also without reward. The researchers interpreted this button as the BI
don’t know button^. The researchers found that the macaques can learn to use this
button efficiently, but they also found that this is a very rare ability in the animal
kingdom. Most animals will ignore the button and the researchers even found this for
very close relatives of the monkeys like capuchin monkeys.12 Smith and colleagues
concluded from these experiments that in macaques we have the first tender shoots of
metacognition. The monkeys do not only try to understand the world, but they also
monitor the cognitive tools that they are using to do world-directed tasks. In other
words, they monitor their own mentality or have attitude-directed states in some sense.
The researchers have a natural interpretation according to which the experiments
very nicely show that at least some non-human animals do have a way of dealing with
their own uncertainty. According to them what is neat about the experiments is that by
introducing the BI don’t know button^, the researchers give the animal the possibility to
not only be uncertain but to show that it is aware of its own uncertainty. The researchers
feel that they can show that the ability to use the button transforms what used to be
11 They love doing these tasks.
12 The picture has become a little more complicated with regard to capuchin monkeys. It has been found that
under certain conditions the capuchins will use the button however it might be possible that this is due to the
specific conditions of these variations of the experiment. Perdue et al. (2015) argue that there is not yet good
evidence that capuchins do show metacognition.
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arbitrary picking into a choice informed by a monitoring of one’s own cognitive
performance. This is very much in line with our earlier discussion, where we defined
choices as conscious managerial actions initiated by unconscious judgments. But the
experiments add to this a specification about what the content of such judgment might
be. If Smith and colleagues are right, then the crucial element is metacognitive
performance monitoring.
The experiments are interesting for us for two reasons. On the one hand, they seem
to demonstrate that there can be metacognitive performance monitoring in creatures
that do not possess mental state concepts – and there is wide ranging agreement that the
apes do not possess such concepts (e.g. Povinelli and Vonk 2003) and they are
nevertheless able to pass the task. This is good news for our account, because if
monkeys can control their attitudes metacognitively despite not having mental state
concepts, then thinking about mental state concepts does not have to be a condition for
metacognitive managerial control either.
At the same time and even better, the experiments also provide us with a scenario
that looks actually like an animal equivalent to the choice situations we are interested in
like e.g. Holton’s fireman case and like Holton’s fireman, the animals are faced with
two competing options and are uncertain about which option to take. Obviously, this is
where the parallel ends, because in order to show that the animals are not only uncertain
but also aware of their uncertainty, the researchers introduce the third button. The
fireman scenario is more complex. In addition, the fireman has the metacognitive
awareness of uncertainty and also a second metacognitive hunch that there is a right
solution. But while the scenario is in this respect obviously different, it is still true that
in both cases an uncertain choice gets resolved with the help of metacognitive feelings.
2.2 But is this metacognition?
Peter Carruthers (2008) has argued that the experiments do not demonstrate that the
animals do have metacognitive abilities. Importantly, though, what is at issue here is the
question whether or not the experiments imply that the apes represent their own
representational states as such. Many people assume that metacognition implies that
there is one state that represents another mental state as a mental state. This ability has
also been termed metarepresentation.
Carruthers is sceptical that the experiments show that the animals have
metarepresentational abilities. However, whether or not Carruthers is correct in holding
that the experiments do not show metarepresentational abilities is not important here as
such, 13 because the metacognition we are interested in here is not supposed to be
dependent on metarepresentation.
Instead, the sense of metacognition I am interested in here is the one defended by
Joelle Proust.
Proust argues that while the metarepresentational sense of metacognition does exist,
metacognition, especially in the empirical sciences, is used in a different way. Here,
metacognition is understood as a form of control or monitoring of ongoing cognitive
activity. Metacognition in this control sense can involve metarepresentation, but it need
not. Instead it might e.g. use non-conceptual doxastic feelings or feelings of knowing
13 As it happens, I actually think that he is right to be sceptical
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(FOKs14) or even have no experiential component at all. Whether metacognition in the
control sense really can be termed Bmeta^ is contentious (see Carruthers 2008 for a
critique of the Proust position). For us, this debate is not important. Whether or not
metacognition is meta in the right sense, it is uncontroversial that such cognitive acts
can cause intentional actions that have cognitive effects downstream.
If we try to translate that thought back into Hieronymi’s terminology, we get
something like the idea that there might be acts of managerial control that are caused
by judgments that are not explicitly attitude-directed. The judgments in question are
e.g. fluency judgments that lead to FOKs, but the subject does not have to be aware of
or even possess the concept of a mental state to have a FOK. The FOK’s trigger
intentional actions, which in turn will have effects on attitudes.
Using this picture, we can also address a worry that Proust has about Hieronymi’s
account of mental actions. Proust argues that self-probing is intentional and thus
Hieronymi’s picture too passive, because Hieronymi does not seem to take into account
more basic level intentional actions that influence cognition. Instead she seems to focus
exclusively on full blown metarepresentational managerial control. That point is as we
have seen in the last section well taken, but what Proust (2013, p. 7–8) does not see is
that even those very basic intentional self probing actions will have evaluative causes.
So while it is true that there are more basic managerial actions than the ones
Hieronymi has in mind it is also clear that even these basic managerial actions
themselves do again depend on basic evaluative ones. This recreates a Hieronymi-
like structure between evaluative and managerial on the non metarepresentational level.
We are now in a position to address the worry from the beginning of this section:
The worry was: How can choice be thought of as managerial control, which is
supposed to be a form of control where the agent intentionally targets attitudes, if
choice is caused by unconscious judgements which very likely do not contain any
metarepresentations and therefore seem not capable of targeting attitudes at all, inten-
tionally or not.
The answer to this question is that it is not necessary to possess mental state concepts
to control mental states as long as you do not control them as such. This is an important
addendum to the Hieronymi distinction. For her, the difference that matters is the
question whether the attitudes that are controlled in a mental action are part of the agent
or an object that the agent intentionally manipulates. What our discussion here has
thrown up is that attitudes can also be controlled if the agent intentionally does
something else (e.g. concentrating on a problem, or inhibiting inner speech) which
has as a side-effect the control of the attitude. Obviously, the agent does not control the
attitude intentionally in these scenarios, but she is acting intentionally and because the
action is controlled by the FOK it is the control of attitudes using intentional action.
Given this it seems natural however to still call this managerial control and given
this understanding, it is now clear how choice can be thought of as an act of managerial
control.15
14 Feeling of Knowing. For a thorough treatment of FOK see e.g. (Koriat 1993)
15 Given that all managerial control involves an intentional action that is caused by a judgment procedural
metacognition in the Proust sense is nevertheless wider than managerial control, because the monitoring here
does not have to work via an intentional mental action like an attention shift or a inhibition.
Choice in a two systems world: picking & weighing
3 Conclusion
Human decisions feel agentive and that seems to be more than a mechanical weighing
of reasons. Holton’s account looked initially impressive in doing this intuition justice. It
seemed as if Holton had come up with an account of choice that was both intentional
and not arbitrary.
Holton offers us an elaborate mix of picking and choosing for reasons. Holton
argued that the conscious system 2 experiences choices as intentional mere pickings.
For the agent, the experience is one of an arbitrary picking of one option over the other,
much in the same way as one would choose between qualitatively identical tins on a
supermarket shelf.
Nevertheless, choices are not mere pickings, because while the agent experiences
them as such they are informed by an unconscious biasing. The system does evaluate
one option as better than the other, but the information is not accessible to the conscious
agent.
Unfortunately, Holton’s account does not stand up to closer scrutiny. While it does
do a good job of explaining the phenomenology of intentional agency in choice this
paper showed us that Holton’s account is misleading in its emphasis on picking.
Picking does have a role in the phenomenology of choice (Deutschländer et al., in
preparation) 16 and the lack of access to the reasons for the choice might well play a big
role in why we have this phenomenology, but it is not relevant in explaining why the
intentional action really is an integral part of what choice is about.
As an alternative to Holton’s emphasis of picking, it was suggested that we should
think of choice as managerial control. That way, it is possible to keep the Holton
architecture of an experience of picking caused by an unconscious judgement, but to
give a more plausible explanation of why intentional actions matter for choice. They
matter because they control our practical rationality in a managerial way.
The biggest seeming problem with the alternative proposal was that mana-
gerial control in the original Hieronymi sense is clearly metarepresentational,
while choices do not even seem to be clearly attitude-directed at all. To address
this worry, we discussed Proust’s work on metacognition in the control sense.
We concluded that we need a wider notion of managerial control. Managerial
control happens when an intentional action has the function to control an
attitude, whether or not the action is controlled by a goal state that is about
attitude control.
Once this is understood we now have an account of choice as intentional
action that both respects the phenomenology and at the same time plausibly
explains the roles of intentional and evaluative components in the decision
process in a two systems framework. The account does lose the element of
picking, but explains its phenomenological seeming importance. This is a good
result, because in the end picking really does not seem to be the kind of thing
that should play a major role in our choices. We do not want our important
choices to be similar to the simple picking of a tin of beans.
16 The notion of arbitrary intentional picking is also very prominent in experimental attempts to implement
free will (see e.g. famously Libet et al. 1983)
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